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Policymakers and the popular press have discussed at great length the
fiscal stress that may be placed on the Social Security Trust Funds by the
aging of the population over the next 20 to 30 years. They have given
far less attention to another problem that will result from this demo-
graphic shift. As the number of elderly increases and as medical
advances extend the life span, there will be more and more people who
re q u i re some form of long-term home or institutional health care. The
nation is not equipped—with either private or public financing vehicles—
to meet this need.
Only a small part of long-term care is paid for privately (that is, paid out
of pocket or through private insurance). Most is paid for by Medicaid,
the program that was designed to ensure health care for the indigent.
The use of Medicaid in this way comes at a high individual and social
cost. To be eligible, patients must divest themselves of most of whatever
financial assets and income they might have, surrendering their own
independence and that of their spouses. More o v e r, the system is con-
ducive to abuse by nonpoor heirs who seek ways to circumvent eligibil-
ity requirements in order to preserve their elderly parents’ assets. Clearly,
another way of financing long-term care is needed. 
Senior Scholar Walter M. Cadette examines the shortcomings of the pre-
sent system and discusses several alternatives: voluntary private insurance
subsidized through the tax system (by deductibility or income-scaled tax
c redits) to increase aff o rdability; mandated private insurance with subsidies
to ensure aff o rdability; and social insurance (a government program along
the lines of Medicare). He makes the case that financing long-term care
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P re f a c efollowing an insurance model, with a safety net in place for those in
g reatest need, would ameliorate the problems that are now arising from a
w e l f a re model based on Medicaid. He recommends an integrated plan—a
blend of public money, private insurance, and other private saving—as an
e fficient and equitable system. 
The need for reform will become more pressing as the surge in the need
for long-term care approaches with the aging of the baby boom genera-
tion. Now is the time to pre p a re—to examine potential problems and
evaluate possible solutions. I hope you find this brief’s arguments helpful
in starting to think about that task. As always, I look forward to hearing
your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, P re s i d e n t
F e b ru a ry 2000
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Social Security and Medicare have been center stage in an ongoing
national debate about the role of government in American life.
Commission after commission has considered how to amend these pro-
grams to make them more attuned to today’s needs and, more important,
to put them on sound financial footing ahead of the aging of the baby
boom generation. In time, some consensus—and, in turn, political
will—about what to do and how to finance it will emerge. 
In contrast, little attention has been paid to long-term care for the
elderly—a looming national problem arising from the same demograph-
ics. During the next 30 years, the nursing-home population will more
than double as the baby boom ages and as continued advances in medi-
cine extend life expectancy. The down side of that longer life span is
that many more Americans will live long enough to re q u i re years of
home care and, in many cases, years of institutionalized care. Moreover,
the cost of a nursing-home stay, which in 1996 averaged $47,000 per
year (Levit et al. 1997), promises to rise more rapidly than the price
level as a whole. 
The problem of financing long-term care looms large even now.
Tr a d i t i o n a l l y, the disabled elderly have been cared for by family mem-
bers, typically women, at home. With the majority of women now in the
work force, providing that care and financing it poses a formidable prob-
lem not a few decades hence as the baby boomers move into old age but
now as their parents do. It is already a major workplace issue as employ-
ees, especially women, have become increasingly hard-pressed to juggle
work and home responsibilities. 
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The nation is not equipped to deal with this problem. Most long-term care
is financed either out-of-pocket, which can be done only by those with
substantial savings, or by Medicaid, which pays for nursing-home care for
those who are too poor to begin with or who have “spent down” their
assets to the maximum level allowed for Medicaid eligibility. Private insur-
ance finances only a fraction (7 percent) of long-term care (Table 1).
By default more than by design, the nation has fashioned a welfare mod e l
for financing long-term care, pushing Medicaid far afield of its original
purpose of providing for medical care of the indigent, in particular those
on Aid to Families with Dependent Children and successor welfare pro-
grams. Strikingly, more than a third of the Medicaid budget goes to long-
t e rm care, mostly to pay for stays in nursing homes (Braden et al. 1998).
Medicaid pays, in whole or in part, for the care of two out of three 
nursing-home residents; measured in patient days, it pays for as much as
80 percent of all expenditures on nursing-home care (Moses 1999).1
The welfare model has also led to two-tier care, with private payers 
often given pre f e rential admission to first-rate facilities and Medicaid 






Private health insuranceb 3.7 4.0
Other payments  3.9 1.6
Government 17.7  51.4
Federal 15.4  34.5
State and local 2.3  16.9
Medicaidc 4.7  39.4
aThe out-of-pocket figures include Social Security paid to beneficiaries, but then
paid back to Medicaid to reduce Medicaid’s portion of a nursing home’s bills.
About 40 percent of out-of-pocket payments are from this source. 
bThis includes the bills paid by ordinary health insurance for the disabled victim
of an automobile accident, for example. It thus exaggerates a bit the size of the
long-term care insurance market. 
cThe Medicaid amounts are from federal and state governments. 
S o u rc e : Bradley R. Braden et al.,“National Health Expenditures, 1997,” H e a l t h
Care Financing Review 20, no. 1 (1998).Financing Long-Term Care
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beneficiaries often consigned to second-rate facilities because state bud-
gets do not stretch to pay higher fees. Even when beneficiaries get into
the better facilities, their care must be financed by cross subsidies (that
is, subsidies from private payers), which are inherently inefficient. 
The welfare model, moreover, has been an open invitation for nonindi-
gent Americans to find ways to maneuver around the maximum assets
re q u i rements. Some people see the transfer of assets to children in
advance of the need for nursing-home care as perfectly legitimate estate
planning, akin to minimizing estate taxes. Others see it as indistinguish-
able from any other “welfare cheating.”
Insurance—public or private or some combination of the two—would be a
far better way to meet the nation’s long-term care needs. Indeed, long-term
c a re is almost perfectly suited to an insurance model in that an extended
nursing-home stay is a low-probability but high-consequence event—the
classic insurance risk. Two out of five Americans over age 65 will spend
some time in a nursing home (Kemper and Murtaugh 1991, cited in Moses
1999). For most, their stay will be for only a few months, say, for re h a b i l i t a-
tion following hip replacement or a stroke. Medicare ordinarily pays most
of the costs associated with such stays. However, one in ten Americans over
65 will re q u i re care for five years or more and will incur costs that if paid
d i rectly from their own assets would bankrupt all but a few families. If every
family were to try to save to meet the cost of such a stay, the resulting sav-
ing would be excessive. Pooling the needed saving through insurance pre-
miums is the natural economic response. But this logical and eff i c i e n t
response has been frustrated by a failure of the private insurance market. 
The challenge for government is to shift the financing of long-term care
t o w a rd an insurance model. Debate should center on how to balance
what people can reasonably be expected to provide for themselves out of
private insurance and what government should provide (Wiener, Illston,
and Hanley 1994).
Whatever the split between public and private responsibility, the costs
will be high. Those costs are determined by the demographics, advances
in medicine, and the often total dependence of the disabled elderly.
Public and private spending for paid home care and institutional services
is projected to increase some 70 percent in constant dollars during the
a8Replacing a Welfare Model with an Insurance Model
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next 20 years and some 70 percent again during the 20 years thereafter—
almost tripling over the 40-year period (Figure 1).2 These incre a s e s
would come on top of the large rise in long-term care expenditures over
the past years (Figure 2). Chances are high, moreover, that spending will
exceed projections.
a9




2000  2010  2020  2030  2040
Source: Congressional Budget Office, “Projections of Expenditures of Long-Term
Care Services for the Elderly,” March 1999.
Figure 2 Long-Term Care Expenditures
Institutional care
Home care
1980 1983 1986  1989  1992  1995
Source: Bradley R. Braden et al.,“National Health Expenditures,” Health Care
Financing Review 20, no. 1 (1998).Financing Long-Term Care
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B e f o re an already inadequate system is subjected to further demands,
the nation would do well to consider alternative approaches to the
financing of long-term care. This paper outlines the alternatives of
subsidized private insurance (both voluntary and compulsory) and
social insurance. It starts by pointing up the deficiencies of the cur-
rent system. To assess the alternatives, it is important to understand
how and why the welfare model is poorly suited to the nation’s long-
t e rm care needs.
A Flawed System
Private Insurance Market Failure
Few Americans insure themselves against an extended nursing-home stay,
but most do carry protection against not only the cost of a major acute ill-
ness but also of such high-probability but low-consequence events as a
visit to a doctor for the flu. The spread of ord i n a ry health insurance has
been powered by federal subsidies in the form of the tax exclusion of
employment-based health benefits (Cadette 1997), while the market for
l o n g - t e rm care insurance has been hobbled by the absence of a similar
s u b s i d y. Only recently have tax benefits been extended to the purchase of
l o n g - t e rm care insurance, and they are quite limited.3
Another reason private insurance has failed to take hold is that many
Americans believe that Medicare will pay for long-term care. Medicare
reimbursement, in fact, is limited to short stays for rehabilitation after an
acute illness; extended stays are the responsibility of the residents pri-
vately or of Medicaid after their assets are exhausted.
The cost of this insurance is higher than it might be for many re a s o n s .
First, the advantages of pooling, which distributes insurance risk and thus
lowers the cost of insurance, are hard to come by. Long-term care insur-
ance is low on the priority list of middle-aged adults and presumably at
the bottom of the list of younger adults. The insurance pool is thus nar-
rowed to those for whom long-term disability is a distinct possibility—
something that greatly increases premiums. The typical buyer of
l o n g - t e rm care insurance is 69 years of age and pays an annual pre m i u m
of $1,800 for a daily nursing-home benefit of about $85—adequate in
some states but woefully short of what is needed in a state such as NewReplacing a Welfare Model with an Insurance Model
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York, where daily charges range upwards of $250 (Health Insurance
Association of America 1995).
Second, administrative costs are inordinately high. Commonly, 60 per-
cent of the first year’s premium and as much as 10 percent of subsequent
p remiums are dedicated to sales, marketing, and other administrative
expenses (Cutler 1993). Ty p i c a l l y, rather than marketing to gro u p s ,
which would both reduce overhead and generate economies thro u g h
pooling, the marketing is to individuals. 
Third, moral hazard (the tendency for insurance to be used if available)
is introduced by bundled pricing (the cost of food and lodging, for exam-
ple, is imbedded in the cost of a nursing-home stay). Also, an institu-
tionalized parent’s children, who in many cases make the decisions about
care, would not decide to have the parent pay privately if the parent did
not have insurance to cover that payment. (Clearly, moral hazard is rife
in Medicare reimbursement for short nursing-home stays for rehabilita-
tion. Almost always, residents return home on the very day reimburse-
ment runs out and out-of-pocket payment must begin.) 
Fourth, adverse selection (the purchase of insurance by consumers who
know they have a greater than average chance of making a claim) makes
it even harder for insurers to generate economies from pooling. When
insurers cannot readily distinguish low risks from high (because of this
i n f o rmation advantage of the insured), the coverage they offer to low-
risk consumers is too little to be attractive to high-risk consumers (Wolfe
1993). Altern a t i v e l y, adequate coverage for high-risk consumers is too
expensive to appeal to low-risk consumers. An “equilibrium” price is
hard, if not impossible, to strike.
Both over- and underpricing thus characterize the market. Underpricing
has posed a danger in that insurers have often abandoned the market
(pocketing the accumulated equity) when subscribers, faced with sharp
i n c reases in premiums, have allowed policies to lapse. Imperfect re g u l a-
tion and limited supervision by state insurance departments with little
experience with long-term care insurance have compounded this pro b l e m
of loss of coverage to the insurers’ advantage (Lutzky and Alecxih 1999). 
The remedy for such market failure is to attract consumers when they are
relatively young, before health problems that might give rise to the needFinancing Long-Term Care
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for long-term care begin to surface. The earlier the insurance is bought,
the less the insured will know about the risk of disability later in life,
which will limit adverse selection and make it less difficult for buyer and
seller to strike an equilibrium price. The earlier the insurance is bought,
however, the greater the risk created by the passage of time (particularly
against the background of the high and uncertain inflation of several
decades) and there f o re the higher the risk premium. Variability in the
future price of care, being an intertemporal and therefore aggregate risk,
is a risk insurers cannot diversify. Insurance markets function well only
when the primary component of risk is cross-sectional, that is, spre a d
across the range of the insured (Cutler 1993). 
I n s u rers have attempted to contain risk premiums by offering policies
stipulating a given dollar payoff rather than a given level of care—a rea-
sonable approach from their perspective but one that often provides too
little coverage to be attractive to high-risk consumers. Whether they be
high- or low-risk, consumers who want to protect themselves against the
cost of an extended nursing-home stay cannot know how much insur-
ance to buy and how much to save through other vehicles.
P e rverse Incentives
Medicaid itself acts as a major, if not the most important, impediment to
the growth of the long-term care insurance market. Even high-income
families presumably ask themselves, “Why pay for insurance when
Medicaid ensures virtually everyone against an extended nursing-home
stay?” Medicaid has become, in effect, universal long-term care insur-
ance—albeit with an outsized deductible (all of the insure d ’s financial
assets but for several thousand dollars in the case of those who are
unmarried) and a similarly outsized co-payment (all of a nursing home
resident’s income but for a small allowance for personal items such as a
haircut and a magazine subscription). 
Asset and income limits are designed to ensure that Medicaid funds go
to those with the greatest need. Most nursing-home residents become
Medicaid-eligible early in their nursing-home stay or are already on
Medicaid when admitted—no surprise considering the high cost of
nursing-home care and the relatively high poverty rate among the so-
called old-old (those over 85), who make up about half of newly admit-
ted residents. While the incidence of poverty among the over- 6 5Replacing a Welfare Model with an Insurance Model
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population has trended down since the mid 1960s, particularly as Social
Security benefits have risen in real terms, it has remained quite high
among the old-old. 
Medicaid funds, however, go to many not in greatest need. Asset and
income limits have given rise to a whole industry of estate planners
adept at helping people meet the letter, although not the spirit, of the
limits. With every application for Medicaid, there must be proof that
assets—whether real or financial—were not transferred to others during
the previous three years, the look-back period. A fortune can be trans-
f e rred as long as that is done three years or more before the Medicaid
application. Trusts, outright gifts, and other means of effectively transfer-
ring assets (for example, purchase of a luxury automobile, expensive jew-
elry, a house, or other assets exempt from the spend-down requirements)
have become commonplace. The higher the per capita income of a state,
the more elaborate the estate planning designed to secure Medicaid eli-
gibility for the nonpoor elderly.4
Even without any advance planning, considerable wealth can be trans-
f e rred without compromising Medicaid eligibility. Indeed, half of a 
nursing-home resident’s financial assets can be sheltered from the spend-
down requirement even within the look-back period as long as the assets
are transferred before an application for Medicaid is submitted—one of
the key findings of a task force on Medicaid operations in New Yo r k
State (New York State Department of Health 1996, cited in Cassidy
1998d). States are required by the federal government to impose waiting
times for Medicaid eligibility. The waiting period is determined by divid-
ing the dollar amount of any assets transferred within the look-back
period by the average monthly charges of a nursing home in that state to
find the length of stay the assets could have paid for. For example, if
$50,000 of a $100,000 nest egg is transferred to a son or daughter when a
p a rent enters a nursing home in a state in which the average cost is
$5,000 per month, the parent would become Medicaid-eligible after 10
months. The parent uses the remaining half of the nest egg to pay pri-
vately. After 10 months, when the waiting period is up (and when the
remaining assets have been exhausted), Medicaid payments begin.
At the end of the process, half of the nest egg will be in the hands of
the next generation, the nursing-home resident will qualify for public
a13Financing Long-Term Care
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assistance, and both the general taxpayer and the subscriber to long-
t e rm care insurance will have paid a high price to fund “middle-class
w e l f a re.” It is not easy for the authorities to prove intent to defraud or
to recover the transferred assets through the courts. Meanwhile, the
nursing home (for which the state has oversight responsibility) must
pay its bills, and the resident—who is often cognitively impaired and
neither morally nor legally responsible for end-running the ru l e s — h a s
to be cared for. 
The New York task force found that half of the state’s nursing-home re s-
idents had succeeded in sheltering some assets.5 A similar finding came
out of a nationwide GAO re p o rt (General Accounting Office 1997,
cited in Cassidy 1998d). An Illinois study concluded that look-back
p e r i ods specified in federal law for the transfer of pro p e rty were rare l y
e n f o rced (State of Illinois, Office of the Auditor General 1993, cited in
Moses 1995). The staff in charge of determining Medicaid eligibility
estimated that 75 percent of the cases in Chicago and 50 percent in
suburban offices had involved pro p e rty transfers (Moses 1995). 
It is hard to imagine a system more conducive to abuse of the elderly.
Spend-down re q u i rements and the surrender of assets to childre n
deprive the elderly of the freedom to make their own decisions about
c a re and of the ability to live independently should they no longer need
institutional care. Spending down to qualify for Medicaid in a nursing
home, while reasonable in a welfare model, has made some elderly vul-
nerable to their childre n ’s greed as well as to their own infirm i t i e s .
H a rdship for Spouses
Even though the welfare model does mean that long-term care can be
provided for most Americans, a Medicaid system is not a perfect substi-
tute for an insurance system. Insurance provides asset protection for
heirs, which Medicaid—at least according to the rule book—does not.
M o re important, insurance provides more financial protection for a
spouse. Under Medicaid rules, the spend-down is joint (although the
spouse who remains in the community may retain more assets and
income than a single or widowed nursing-home entrant). Approximately
$80,000 of financial assets and the income considered sufficient for the
community spouse’s needs—which varies by state and with part i c u l a r
a14Replacing a Welfare Model with an Insurance Model
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circumstances—may be retained. Typically, real assets, such as the own-
ership of a family home, are not affected, although many states attempt
to get possession of real property when both the community spouse and
the nursing-home resident die. 
Financial assets of $80,000 may seem like a generous exemption, but spend-
ing down to that level is tantamount to impoverishment for a community
spouse if income from other sources is inadequate. In any case, the income
limits can create genuine hardship, especially for a relatively young spouse.
The defense against this hardship is often a re s o rt to fictitious, even if legal,
d i v o rce or “spousal refusal” to pay nursing-home bills as they come due.
All in all, the financial burden on a spouse in a system that relies almost
exclusively on out-of-pocket payments and welfare can be heavy. No
such burden, however, is put on a son or daughter. No one has a legal
financial responsibility to pay for a parent’s nursing-home bills nor does
Medicaid impose one. The same holds true for a parent who has a dis-
abled adult child. 
Tw o - Tier Care
Private payment, more o v e r, can buy entry into the best facilities,
w h e reas Medicaid beneficiaries are more likely to be refused because
those facilities cannot cover the cost of caring for a resident with the
amount a state government is pre p a red to reimburse under Medicaid
(typically 20 percent to 30 percent less than the private-pay charg e s ) .
With most nursing homes privately owned and operated, it is a straight-
forward business decision to accept the private payer and turn away the
Medicaid beneficiary. State “certificate of need” regulations, which gov-
ern the supply of nursing-homes beds and effectively keep the nursing-
home industry operating with little or no spare capacity, make that an
easy decision. 
The Clinton administration has proposed legislation that would prohibit
nursing homes from requiring residents to leave once they had spent
down and become eligible for Medicaid. More than any other, this prac-
tice points up the vulnerability of Medicaid beneficiaries in a two-tier
c a re regime. It also points up the financial squeeze on nursing homes
that results from the failure of Medicaid reimbursement to cover the cost
of quality care. Financing Long-Term Care
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State regulation offers weak defense against two-tier care. State govern-
ments, to be sure, regulate all nursing home facilities in elaborate detail.
However, the regulators necessarily concentrate on variables that can be
easily measured and checked: number of lights in a hallway, height of
tables and chairs, number of staff with this credential or that. What
makes a facility genuinely first-rate often eludes regulatory oversight. 
Ensuring quality care for Medicaid beneficiaries will become even more dif-
ficult under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. Among its provisions for
economizing on federal health-care spending is the repeal of the 1980
B o ren Amendment to the Medicaid Act, which assured beneficiaries in
nursing homes of some measure of quality care. The amendment re q u i re d
that Medicaid cover the costs needed to operate a home in conformity with
both federal and state standards. With its repeal, states will have almost
complete freedom to set reimbursement rates. With those rates already low
relative to the cost of first-rate care, Medicaid beneficiaries will go furt h e r
back in the queue for acceptance at the most desirable facilities.
Insurance Options
Replacing a welfare model with an insurance model would ameliorate, if
not remedy, all of these problems: two-tier care, commandeering of lim-
ited welfare funds by middle- and high-income people through the trans-
fer of assets, and the impoverishment of those who “play by the rules.”
The welfare of all the disabled elderly in need of Medicaid benefits is at
stake because of two-tier care practices—a problem that promises to
worsen as economies mandated by the Balanced Budget Act, for
M e d i c a re as well as Medicaid, take full effect over coming years. At
stake also is “honest government”—one that not only does not fund
inheritance protection but that also genuinely protects those with great-
est need. Meeting the requirements of a welfare model, moreover, threat-
ens community spouses whose re s o u rces are depleted and those few
nursing-home residents who have become Medicaid-eligible but eventu-
ally are in a position to re t u rn home. Spending down makes it finan-
cially impossible for them ever to live independently again. 
What is called for is a set of policies that would overcome the failure of
t od a y ’s long-term care insurance market. High on the list would be mea-
s u res to bring the benefits of pooling to that market to bring down cost.Replacing a Welfare Model with an Insurance Model
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Administrative costs under an insurance model promise to be lower than
under a welfare model. Of necessity, Medicaid dedicates much of its budget
to the difficult and costly enforcement of income and asset eligibility rules. 
L o n g - t e rm care insurance would remain unaff o rdable for many, just as
o rd i n a ry health insurance is. A safety net would have to remain in
place—whether in the form of subsidized insurance for those with low
and moderate income or Medicaid much as it currently exists. Clearly,
h o w e v e r, an insurance model cannot be developed as long as most
Americans needing long-term care can turn to a safety net in the first
instance. Medicaid or other safety net funds have to be re s e rved for
those in greatest need.
Vo l u n t a r y Insurance with Subsidization
One option would be for government to subsidize the premiums of those
who purchase long-term care insurance—either directly or, more likely
as a practical matter, through the tax system—in order to promote the
development of the market. For example, subsidies could be keyed to
income under an income-scaled tax-credit arrangement or they could be
extended to all purchasers through tax deductibility of premiums, which
would benefit all by lowering the after-tax cost of the insurance. The
purchase of insurance would be voluntary; the insurance, although subsi-
dized, would be bought like any other private insurance. 
By enlarging the long-term care insurance market, subsidies could well
reduce government’s long-term care bill, as they could shift more of the
total bill onto private payers. In comparison with Medicaid’s cost to sup-
port a resident in a nursing home (or even government’s cost to provide
home care), the subsidies would be shallow. But they would be extended
to many more people, including those who would never have reason to
call on the subsidized insurance (presumably, most of the new purchasers
brought into the market).
Economies possible through extensive, but relatively shallow, subsidies
have prompted a number of states (New York, California, Connecticut,
and Indiana) to fashion “partnership” programs that allow people who
purchase a certified long-term care insurance policy to deduct the pro-
ceeds of those policies from the spend-down necessary to establish
Public Policy BriefFinancing Long-Term Care
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Medicaid eligibility.6 New York re q u i res that a participant purc h a s e
t h ree years of nursing-home coverage, after which Medicaid eligibility
can be established without an asset test. California and Connecticut
operate a dollar-for-dollar program, under which insurance proceeds are
deducted from the spend-down re q u i rement. Indiana has adopted a
hybrid of the two; asset protection depends on the extensiveness of the
insurance coverage (McCall and Korb 1998). 
P a rtnerships effectively reduce the price of long-term care insurance to par-
ticipants—a key element in any strategy to replace a welfare with an insur-
ance model. Participants, in effect, can get considerably more long-term
c a re insurance coverage than they have to pay for—an outcome no diff e r-
ent in substance from direct subsidization of the premiums themselves. 
All in all, however, partnership arrangements have been disappointing.
Despite the subsidization, they have not given rise to significant expan-
sion of the long-term insurance market, even in New York where the
wealthy can buy virtually unlimited inheritance protection for a re l a-
tively small premium. Partnerships have attracted some consumers into
the market, but about two-thirds of the participants would have bought
the insurance on their own and the absolute number of part i c i p a n t s
remains minuscule (Wiener and Stevenson 1998).7
P a rtnerships do not confront the formidable forces that have kept the
long-term insurance market small and underdeveloped. Inadequate pool-
ing remains a serious problem. The need for long-term care coverage is
no more pressing to the young and middle-aged. And, for the elderly,
calling on a certified policy in a partnership state is a prelude to becom-
ing a Medicaid beneficiary anyway. Even if partnerships provide protec-
tion for estates, they require following all the rest of Medicaid’s stringent
poverty-oriented rules. 
Adverse selection plagues partnership arrangements just as it does ord i n a ry
insurance. Partnerships attract even more of those at high risk because of
the implicit reduction in price. Those at low risk apparently have not
found inheritance protection enough of an enticement to buy insurance
intimately linked to Medicaid. The underlying problem is that the appeal
of long-term care insurance is limited to those with relatively high
income—the most important segment of the market but one that isReplacing a Welfare Model with an Insurance Model
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unwilling to take its chances on the care available to Medicaid beneficia-
ries or to accept the welfare stigma that Medicaid traditionally has carried. 
Inadequate pooling and adverse selection would remain under just about
any kind of voluntary system for promoting long-term care insurance. A
system of tax deductibility, more o v e r, would create serious problems of
its own. The tax exclusion of employment-based health benefits has
been a major force behind the rapid rise in health-care costs over the
years. It has pushed health insurance in the direction of incre a s i n g l y
comprehensive benefits and then, as moral hazard would have predicted,
overuse of those benefits as if they were “free.” It also extends the largest
subsidies to those with the highest income because of the progressivity of
the tax system (Cadette 1997). 
Mandated Insurance with T a x - C redit Support
A second option would be to re q u i re Americans to carry long-term care
insurance as they are now generally re q u i red to carry automobile insur-
ance. The argument for compulsory purchase of insurance is the same as
for compulsory participation in Social Security and Medicare. Vo l u n t a ry
saving is inadequate to finance re t i rement and medical care for the
elderly; meeting those needs is a desirable social objective; it is re a s o n-
able, there f o re, to impose forced saving. 
Private and voluntary saving is similarly inadequate to the task of
financing long-term care. It finances, through out-of-pocket spending
and through insurance, only about 40 percent of what is needed. The
rest comes mainly from general public sector revenue—a reflection of
the desirable societal objective of meeting those needs. By default, soci-
ety at large has become the major payer of the nation’s long-term care
bill. There f o re, it may as well use its status as payer to bring about a
financing regime (forced public saving) more in keeping with the
b ro a d e r, and acknowledged, public interest. Opinion will differ as to
whether requiring people to carry long-term care insurance would be a
legitimate use of the power of the state, but there is a precedent in auto
insurance. The “free rider” problem that justifies making auto insurance
compulsory plagues reliance on Medicaid for long-term care just as well. 
As a practical matter, private insurance coverage could not be 
mandated unless it could be made aff o rdable to those with low and
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m oderate income. The idea would be to re q u i re all adult Americans to
c a rry a specified amount of long-term care insurance (enough, say, to
make a claim for Medicaid unlikely) or to substantiate that they are in
a position to self-insure their own long-term care, that is, that they can
pay for their care out-of-pocket or through private insurance without
calling on Medicaid. The premiums of those with low and mod e r a t e
income could be paid through income-scaled tax credits. For example,
the credits, which could be refundable if there were no tax liability,
might pay 100 percent of the premium for a couple whose adjusted
g ross income was $20,000, 50 percent at an income of $60,000, and
nothing at $100,000.8
Another method would be to calculate tax credits in dollar amounts. That
w a y, the cost of long-term care insurance paid out-of-pocket would not rise
as people aged and necessarily faced higher premiums for the same cover-
age. The choice is between using tax credits to create an insurance plan
whose premiums would rise with actuarial risk and one that, like Social
Security and Medicare, would transfer income across generations. 
Requiring Americans to carry insurance would end the routine claim on
Medicaid for long-term care. It would greatly reduce the price of the
insurance by bring into the market young and middle-aged adults to
form a large risk pool. Income-scaled tax credits to make such a require-
ment affordable would target subsidies more effectively than do partner-
ship arrangements or tax deductibility. 
Social Insurance
Another option is social insurance—a universal, compulsory pro g r a m
a d m i n i s t e red by the government and funded through general or ear-
marked taxes. In a clear break from the welfare model, it would establish
l o n g - t e rm care as an earned right, much as it would be under private
insurance. Most nursing-home care is provided in the form of public
c h a r i t y, after the passing of a means test, which is all too prone to 
“gaming.” Hospitalization for an acute illness of someone over 64 on
Medicare, in contrast, is an earned right, not subject to a means test. 
All of the benefits of an insurance model—most important, pooling—
come to the fore if the insurance is social in nature, just as they do if the
insurance is private. And there is an added plus: administrative costs are
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apt to be distinctly lower than would be possible in the private market.
G o v e rnment, more o v e r, would be in a position to adjust, ex post, t h e
taxes needed to finance social insurance in a way private insurers could
not adjust premiums (Cutler 1993). Government, in effect, would be
better able to deal with the intertemporal risks insurers find difficult, if
not imprudent, to assume.
Wiener, Illston, and Hanley (1994) have estimated that funding a com-
p rehensive social insurance plan by means of payroll taxes to pro v i d e
nursing-home coverage and to expand access to home care would require
a tax rate, without a ceiling on taxable wages, of almost 3 percent today
and almost 4 percent by 2018. It would rise sharply after 2018 to reach
almost 8 percent by 2048 when the demand for long-term care would
peak. 
These estimates, it should be stressed, incorporate the cost of financing
current public programs for long-term care, which today is about 1.5 per-
cent of payroll. The new payroll taxes would replace the claim on gen-
eral revenue now made by Medicaid (which would also rise sharply after
2018 because of the same demographics). They would also replace that
p a rt of the Medicare tax rate that finances home care and post-acute
care in a nursing home (that, too, is projected to increase significantly as
the baby boom generation ages). 
In time, the new payroll taxes would become quite large; the 8 percent of
p a y roll by 2048 is still roughly double current policy costs (an estimated
3.5 percent if current public programs were continued) but on a much
l a rger base. Financing a comprehensive social insurance plan for long-term
c a re may not re q u i re a greatly higher overall tax rate in the next few years
or even 20 years out—a simple reflection of the role Medicaid now plays
in financing long-term care and of the relatively benign demographics
ahead for a while. But it would re q u i re quite a large increase in the overall
tax rate—an increase of 4 percentage points or more of payroll (some 3
p e rcentage points or more of GDP)—eventually. The increase, more o v e r,
would come on top of any new payroll taxes needed to put Social Security
re t i rement and Medicare on sound financial footing. 
Social insurance would yield the same outcomes as mandated insurance
backed by income-scaled tax credits. And there need not be much, if
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a n y, diff e rence between the two approaches for the distribution of
income. How that distribution would be affected would depend on the
revenue sources chosen, the levels of the tax credits and their adjust-
ment for age, the nature of the coverage, and other particulars. 
A mandate would be significantly different from social insurance in one
key respect. In a clear break with tod a y ’s undue dependence on
Medicaid, it would put the responsibility for long-term care back in the
private sector. It would be workable, however, only because of public
funding in the form of sliding-scale tax credits.
Subsidizing Partial Coverage
The nation could move a long way in the direction of an insurance
model without launching a comprehensive social insurance plan or with-
out making a commitment to a similarly costly subsidization of compul-
sory private insurance. The policy challenge is to move in that direction
at reasonable cost. 
One approach would be to limit public funding (through social insur-
ance or subsidized private insurance) to “front-end” coverage—to
expenses incurred in, say, the first six months or first year in a nursing
h o m e .9 Social insurance, which could be applied to bills for home or
institutional care, would end after six months or a year; any subsidies to
buy the requisite private insurance would be limited to premiums on
policies that had quite short payoff periods. After that, people would
have to pay for long-term care out-of-pocket, call on additional but
unsubsidized insurance, or, as a last—not first—resort, turn to Medicaid.
The front-end approach is of particular benefit to nursing-home re s i-
dents who could be expected to re t u rn to independent living. They
could retain the financial means to do so if they could rely on insurance
benefits to cover much or all of the cost of a short nursing-home stay.
Even a relatively short stay (unless it follows an acute illness and thus is
paid for by Medicare) can compromise financial independence. 
An alternative would be to fund the “back end” through the public sec-
tor. Social insurance or subsidized private insurance would kick in only
after a specified time, say, six months or a year.1 0 It would be a form 
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of “catastrophic” coverage, with people responsible for funding the 
f ront end on their own. (Seamless coverage would be provided by a 
combination of subsidized and unsubsidized insurance, just as the advent
of Medicare gave rise to supplementary health insurance policies to
finance the acute care Medicare does not reimburse.) 
However useful in limiting the public cost of moving to an insurance
model, both front-end and back-end approaches are far from ideal. The
minority of nursing-home residents in a position to return home would
benefit from front-end coverage, but others would not. And it is not at
all clear that such limited coverage would do all that much to spur the
development of an insurance market for the back end. The net overall
effect could well be quite small, leaving the nation with Medicaid as the
mainstay of long-term care financing. The back-end approach has more
promise for systemic change, in particular, for encouraging people to buy
supplementary policies. But many low- and moderate-income Americans
would not be in a position to do so; they would still have to turn to
Medicaid to pay the front-end costs. 
M o re important, back-end coverage would benefit heirs in a way that is
wholly inconsistent with the use of public funds—something that raises
serious question about any social insurance mechanism, which by its
n a t u re distributes benefits as an earned right without re g a rd to income.
This problem could be dealt with if deductibles and co-payments were
scaled to income. That, however, would diminish the insurance character,
and emphasize the welfare character, of any social insurance mechanism. 
Wiener, Illston and Hanley (1994) have argued that estate taxes could
(and probably should) be used to finance back-end care, for pre c i s e l y
that reason. It is not at all clear, however, how much scope there is for a
rise in estate taxes beyond levels that many believe have become confis-
catory, especially as they affect family-owned businesses. With the fed-
eral estate-tax deductible now scheduled to rise to seven figures, many
quite significant estates would be protected by social insurance for back-
end care unless that deductible were cut substantially. Financing social
insurance for back-end care by means of estate taxes would eliminate the
gaming that now plagues Medicaid, but public money would still be
directed to ends that are hard, if not impossible, to justify. 
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Inheritance protection is much less of a problem for income-scaled 
tax credits for the purchase of private long-term care insurance. It 
nevertheless points up the need to limit subsidization to those at low and
moderate income, lest the subsidies serve no more useful public purpose
than enriching heirs. 
An Integrated Plan 
All in all, the policy choice is far from straightforward. Clearly, however,
universal insurance has the virtue of putting explicit responsibility for
long-term care on society as a whole rather than on those relatively few
individuals unlucky enough to require expensive care at the end of their
lives. And it has the virtue of ending the use of Medicaid for purposes
those welfare funds are ill-suited to finance. On balance, a new blend of
public money, private insurance, and other private saving is called for.
An effective solution is one that would: 
1. Integrate front-end care into Medicare, creating a Medicare Part C, building
on the practice of reimbursing care after an acute illness. The disabled elderly
would be reimbursed by Medicare for the first six months or a year of
home or institutional care, ending the wholly artificial distinction that
now exists between rehabilitation after an acute illness and the kind of
c a re necessitated by a chronic condition (Rivlin and Wiener 1988). 
2. Mandate back-end insurance coverage and support it with income-scaled
tax cre d i t s . L o n g - t e rm care insurance would become aff o rdable. The
income scaling would minimize use of public money for estate pro t e c-
tion. Subsidies would be targeted, as they would not be if long-term care
insurance were simply made tax deductible or subsidized under partner-
ship arrangements. Moreover, even if heavily subsidized, insurance that
is private would be fully funded, an especially important feature because
of the unusually unfavorable demographics on the horizon. Funding
would put much of the burden of financing the nation’s pro s p e c t i v e l y
outsized long-term care bill on the large generation that eventually will
make the claim on the resources. Funding would also prevent the public
cost of long-term care from ever reaching the heights it would rise to
under pay-as-you-go social insurance.Replacing a Welfare Model with an Insurance Model
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3. Cut back Medicare reimbursement for routine health care to finance
M e d i c a re front-end long-term care coverage. The financial stress Medicare
faces as the baby boom ages is an opportunity not only to shift the pro-
gram toward catastrophic coverage but also to rethink the scope of the
c a re Medicare now finances.1 1 Some scaling back of Part A and Part B
benefits for the routine care of middle- and high-income beneficiaries
would offer scope for a Part C, and it would make the program as a
whole more consistent with the logic and purpose of insurance.1 2 A
heavily subsidized health plan that is blind to income for all over the
age of 64 may have made sense in the 1960s when Medicare was
launched, but not now. Health care commanded less than half the share
of GDP it does now, life expectancies were much lower, and the average
income of the elderly compared with that of the population at large was
much lower.
4. Tighten Medicaid eligibility by lengthening look-back periods and otherw i s e
making it difficult for people to count on Medicaid to finance long-term care .
Any eff o rt to shift to an insurance model will fail unless Medicaid ru l e s
a re stiffened. The object is not to deny needed support to the disabled
e l d e r l y, but to make it more costly for people to rely on Medicaid in the
first instance. Serious consideration ought to be given to the constitu-
tionality of outlawing estate planning services designed to end-ru n
Medicaid spend-down rules. 
Such a program could come into effect in stages. A pilot project could be
designed to test, first, whether it would be necessary to impose a mandate in
o rder to shift the paradigm from welfare to insurance and, second, what it
would take by way of tax credits or other subsidy to achieve that outcome.1 3
A generous enough tax credit might well spur enough demand for long-term
c a re insurance to make a mandate unnecessary. Chances for the success of a
v o l u n t a ry program would rise even further if Medicaid eligibility were made
considerably more difficult than it is tod a y.
T h e re is ample time to put in place a financing stru c t u re for long-term
c a re that would be more equitable and efficient than tod a y ’s reliance on
Medicaid. The surge in long-term care related to the baby boom genera-
tion is still some time off and the federal government (ultimately the tax-
payer) is already the major payer. Eventually, though, the nation must be
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ready to cope with a quantum jump in the demand for long-term care and
to finance it in a sensible way. Ready or not, that jump is on its way. 
N o t e s
1.   Whether that large a slice of the Medicaid budget has crowded out the med-
ical care of the poor for which the program was designed is hard to say. Any
inadequacy in that respect is not necessarily due to the slice; Congress, after
all, has had the opportunity to vote appropriations that would cover both
uses of Medicaid funds. Having the opportunity and taking it, however, are
two diff e rent things at a time of spending constraints coming out of the
large and once seemingly intractable budget deficits of the 1980s and 1990s.
2.   Paid home care is unlikely to yield economies in the use of long-term care.
Experience with publicly funded programs, which a decade or so ago were
viewed as a means of keeping disabled elderly in less costly settings, points
to little substitution. The experience, rather, has been that publicly paid
home care has substituted for unpaid family care and has added to the help
available to the elderly. The difficulty of identifying people who will enter a
nursing home has made it difficult to target services to those who might be
deflected from entering a home if generally less costly alternatives like home
care were available (Kane 1994).
3.   The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 made
long-term care premiums tax deductible, but only within limits and only if
they and other nonreimbursed medical expenses exceed 7.5 percent of
adjusted gross income. The benefits also became exempt from income tax. 
4.   My own experience may not be typical, but it is surely not uncommon.
Several years ago, my mother (then in her early eighties) spent several
months in a nursing home in New York for postoperative care. During that
time and for another year or so thereafter, I was called by at least 20 firms
offering their “asset protection” services. 
5.   Wiener (1996a, b) maintains that asset transfers are a relatively minor prob-
lem, judging by the financial and real-estate net worth of the elderly. The
distribution of wealth is quite wide among the elderly, however, as well as
among the population at large. Wealth data for the elderly also reflect past
transfers of assets.
6.   Massachusetts canceled its partnership program on grounds that it did not
want state support for long-term care to be viewed as an entitlement. 
7.   The University of Maryland Center on Aging and the U.S. Bureau of the
Census have estimated that partnerships in California and New York com-
bined (which have an over-65 population of 6 million) have attracted only
17,000 subscribers (cited in Wiener and Stevenson 1998). 
8.   To be sure, unaffordability is the reason such a large number of Americans
lack health insurance. Inability to develop a consensus for universal health
c a re, however, need not block the nation from addressing other health-
related issues, such as long-term care. The use of funds for long-term care
competes in the political arena with all uses of federal dollars, not only with
those directed to health care. Replacing a Welfare Model with an Insurance Model
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9.   This is the thrust of legislation sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy
(D–Mass.). 
10.  Legislation for back-end social insurance was sponsored by former Senator
George Mitchell (D–Maine).  
11.  The alternative is less and less reimbursement for the same service. The
assumption implicit in the Balanced Budget Act and in the budgets of the
Clinton administration is that squeezing hospitals and physicians by lower-
ing reimbursement rates will have little or no effect on health-care quality—
a dubious assumption indeed. 
12.  The same could be said about coverage of prescription drugs, which relative
to the incomes of some beneficiaries amount to a catastrophic expense, but
a re small in the total picture for others. Reimbursement of large, but not
routine, drug costs would be a more reasonable application of the insurance
principle than is embodied in the Clinton administration’s proposal for sub-
sidized coverage of all prescription drugs irrespective of need.
13. Such a pilot project would have to look carefully at ways to minimize moral
h a z a rd. Death and re t i rement are easy to adjudicate; disability is not. Co-
payments and deductibles (income scaled to reflect the objective of replac-
ing Medicaid with insurance) would help to minimize moral hazard.
R e f e r e n c e s
Aaron, Henry J. 1991. Serious and Unstable Condition: Financing America’s Health
Care. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Altfest, Louis J. 1998. “Do You Need Long-Te rm Care Insurance?” M e d i c a l
Economics, March 23.
Binstock, Robert H., Leighton E. Cluff, and Otto Von Mering, eds. 1996. The
Future of Long-Term Care. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Binstock, Robert H., and William D. Spector. 1997. “Five Priority Areas for
Research of Long-Term Care.” Health Services Research 32, no. 5: 715–730.
Braden, Bradley R., Cathy A. Cowan, Helen C. Lazenby, Anne B. Mart i n ,
Patricia A. McDonnell, Arthur L. Sensenig, Jean M. Stiller, Lekha S.
Whittle, Carolyn S. Donham, Anna M. Long, and Madie W. Stewart. 1998.
“National Health Expenditures, 1997.” Health Care Financing Review 2 0 ,
no. 1: 83–126.
Bragg, John M. 1997. “Try a Better Response to the LTC Challenge.” National
Underwriter, October 13, 7, 22.
Cadette, Walter M. 1997. Prescription for Health Care Policy. Public Policy Brief
no. 30. Annandale-on-Hudson, N.Y.: The Jerome Levy Economics
Institute.
Cassidy, Thomas M. 1997a. Elder Care: What to Look for, What to Look Out For!
Far Hills, N.J.: New Horizon Press.
— — —. 1997b. “Make Home Health Care Consumer-Driven.” Investor’s Business
Daily, September 30. 
———. 1998a. “Competition Needed for Nursing Homes.” The Journal News,
October 19, 50.Financing Long-Term Care
Public Policy Brief a28
———. 1998b. “How to Avoid Crime by Home Health Workers.” Wa s h i n g t o n
Post, October 13.
———. 1998c. “Long-Te rm Care Financing Traps Seniors in a Squeeze Play. ”
Insight, February 16, 30.
———. 1998d. “Long-Te rm Care Problems and Solutions: A Prescription 
for Change.” Institute Perspectives. White Plains, N.Y.: Institute for
Socioeconomic Studies.
———. 1998e. “Use Surplus to Improve Lot of Elderly.” The Citizen Register,
June 21.
Congressional Budget Office. 1999. “Projections of Expenditures for Long-Term
C a re Services for the Elderly.” Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office.
Committee for Economic Development. 1989. Care and Cost: Current Issues in
Health Policy, edited by Kenneth McLennan and Jack A. Meyer. Boulder,
Colo.: Westview Press.
C o ronel, Susan. 1998. L o n g - Te rm Care Insurance in 1996. Washington, D.C.:
Health Insurance Association of America.
Cutler, David. 1993. “Why Doesn’t the Market Fully Insure Long-Term Care?”
Working Paper 4301. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Cutler, David M., and Louise M. Sheiner. 1993. “Policy Options for Long-Term
C a re.” Working Paper 4302. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Fuchs, Victor R. 1996. Individual and Social Responsibility: Child Care, Education,
Medical Care, and Long-Te rm Care in America. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
———. 1998. “Health Care for the Elderly: How Much? Who Will Pay for It?”
Working Paper 6755. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic
Research.
General Accounting Office. 1997. Medicaid: Divestiture of Assets to Qualify for
Long-Term Care Services. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
Gordon, Lawrence J., and Andrew Bressler. 1998. “Banking: Financing Trends in
an Acquisitive Health Care Market—Focus on Long-Term Care.” Journal of
Health Care Finance, Summer, 39–50.
Gray, Wendy B., and Susan Henrikson, eds. 1990. A Bottom-Line Perspective on
Health Care Costs. Research Report 939. New York: The Conference Board.
Health Insurance Association of America. 1995. Who Buys Long-Te rm Care
Insurance? Washington, D.C.: Health Insurance Association of America.
Hudson, Robert. 1997. “Long-Te rm Care: The New Risks of Old Age.”
Challenge, May-June, 103–115.
Kane, Robert L. 1994. “Long-Te rm Care in the United States: Problems and
Promise.” In Theodore R. Marmor, Timothy M. Smeeding, and Vernon L.
G reene, eds., Economic Security and Intergenerational Justice. Wa s h i n g t o n ,
D.C.: Urban Institute.
Kane, Robert L., Rosalie A. Kane, Richard C. Ladd, and Wendy Nielsen Veazie.
1998. “Variation in State Spending for Long-Term Care: Factors Associated
with More Balanced Systems.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 23,
no. 2: 363–390.
a28Replacing a Welfare Model with an Insurance Model
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College a29 a29
K e m p e r, Peter, and Christopher Murtaugh. 1991. “Lifetime Use of Nursing
Home Care.” New England Journal of Medicine 324, no. 9: 595.
K ronenfeld, Jennie Jacobs. 1993. C o n t roversial Issues in Health Care Policy.
Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage.
Levit, Katharine, Cathy A. Cowan, Bradley R. Braden, Jean M. Stiller, Arthur L.
Sensenig, and Helen C. Lazenby. 1998. “National Health Expenditures in
1997: More Slow Growth.” Health Affairs 17, no. 6: 99–109.
Levit, Katharine, Helen C. Lazenby, Bradley R. Braden, Cathy A. Cowan,
A rthur L. Sensenig, Patricia A. McDonnell, Jean M. Stiller, Darleen K.
Won, Anne B. Martin, Lekha Sivarajan, Carolyn S. Donham, Anna M.
Long, and Madie W. Stewart. 1997. “National Health Expenditures, 1996.”
Health Care Financing Review 19, no. 1: 161–200.
Littell, Bob. 1998. “How Insurers Can Avoid an LTC Apocalypse.” N a t i o n a l
Underwriter, April 27, 82–85.
L u t z k y, Steven, and Lisa Alecxih. 1998. “Proposals for Products to Avoid an
Apocalyptic LTC Scenario.” National Underwriter, February 23, 45–47.
———. 1999. “Enabling Informed Consumer Choice in the Long-Te rm Care
Insurance Market.” Journal of Aging & Social Policy 10, no. 3: 27–44.
McCall, Nelda, and Jodi Korb. 1998. “The Partnership for Long-Term Care and
the Future Policy Debate on Long-Te rm Care Financing.” Health Policy
R e s e a rch Series, Discussion Paper 98-2. San Francisco: Laguna Researc h
Associates.
Marmor, Theodore R., Timothy M. Smeeding, and Vernon L. Greene, eds. 1994.
Economic Security and Intergenerational Justice. Washington, D.C.: Urban
Institute.
Merrill, Jeffrey. 1992. “A Test of Our Society: How and for Whom We Finance
L o n g - Te rm Care.” I n q u i ry (Blue Cross Blue Shield Association), Summer,
176–187.
Moon, Marilyn, and Janemarie Mulvey. 1996. Entitlements and the Elderly:
Protecting Promises, Recognizing Reality. Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute.
Moses, Stephen. 1995. “The Magic Bullet: How to Pay for Universal Long-Term
Care.” Seattle: Center for Long-Term Care Financing.  
———. 1999. The Myth of Unaffordability: How Most Americans Should, Could,
and Would Buy Private Long-Term Care Insurance. Seattle: Center for Long-
Term Care Financing. 
Murtaugh, Christopher M., Peter Kemper, and Brenda C. Spillman. 1995. “Risky
Business: Long-Te rm Care Insurance Underwriting.” I n q u i ry (Blue Cro s s
Blue Shield Association), Fall, 271–284.
New York State Department of Health. 1996. Securing New York’s Future. Report
to the Governor and Legislature, State of New York. Cited in Thomas 
M. Cassidy, “Long-Te rm Care Problems and Solutions: A Prescription 
for Change.” Institute Perspectives. White Plains, N.Y.: Institute 
for Socioeconomic Studies.  
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 1996. Caring for Frail
Elderly People: Policies in Evolution. Social Policy Studies 19. Paris: OECD.
Pauly, Mark. 1996. “Almost Optimal Social Insurance for Long-Term Care.” In
Roland Eisen and Frank Sloan, eds., Long-Term Care: Economic Issues and
Policy Solutions. Boston: Kluwer Academic.Financing Long-Term Care
Public Policy Brief a30
Pauly, Mark, and Peter Zweifel. 1996. Financing Long-Term Care: What Should Be
the Government’s Role? Washington, D.C.: AEI Press
Pear, Robert. 1999. “Some Credit for Those Who Must Give Care.” New York
Times, January 10, Personal Business 7.
Phelps, Charles E. 1992. Health Economics. New York: HarperCollins.
Reschovsky, James D. 1996. “Demand for and Access to Institutional Long-Term
Care: The Role of Medicaid in Nursing Home Markets.” Inquiry (Blue Cross
Blue Shield Association), Spring, 15–29.
Rivlin, Alice M., and Joshua M. Wiener. 1988. Caring for the Disabled: Who Will
Pay? Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Rowland, Diane, Judith Feder, and Alina Salganicoff, eds. 1993. M e d i c a i d
Financing Crisis: Balancing Responsibilities, Priorities, and Dollars.
Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science.
Sloan, Frank, and Edward C. Norton. 1997. “Adverse Selection, Bequests,
C rowding Out, and Private Demand for Insurance: Evidence from the
L o n g - Te rm Care Insurance Market.” J o u rnal of Risk and Uncert a i n t y 1 5 :
201–219.
State of Illinois, Office of the Auditor General. 1993. P rogram Audit:
Enforcement of Property Transfer Laws. Springfield, Ill.
Stone, Amy. 1998. “Long-Term-Care Coverage Catches On.” Business Week,July
27, 88.
Van de Wa t e r, Paul, ed. 1992. “Social Insurance Issues for the Nineties.”
C o n f e rence Pro c e e d i n g s , National Academy of Social Insurance, Dubuque,
Iowa. 
West, Diane. 1997. “Insurers Eye Younger LTC Buyers.” National Underw r i t e r,
October 13, 7, 26.
Wiener, Joshua M. 1996a. “Can Medicaid Long-Term Care Expenditures for the
Elderly Be Reduced?” The Gerontologist 3, no. 6. 
— — —. 1996b. “Public Policies on Medicaid Asset Transfer and Estate Recovery:
How Much Money to Be Saved?” Generations, Fall, 72–76 . 
———. 1998a. “Jump Starting the Market.” In Leslie C. Walker, Elizabeth H.
Bradley, and Terri Wetle, eds., Public and Private Responsibilities in Long-Term
Care. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
———. 1998b. “State Policy on Long-Term Care for the Elderly.” Health Affairs
17, no. 3: 81–100.
Wi e n e r, Joshua M., and Alison Evans. 1998. Public and Private Responsibilities:
Home and Community-Based Services in the United Kingdom and Germ a n y.
Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute.
Wiener, Joshua M., and Laurel Hixon Illston. 1994. “Health Care Reform in the
1990s: Where Does Long-Te rm Care Fit In?” The Gero n t o l o g i s t 34, no. 3:
402–408.
Wiener, Joshua M., Laurel Hixon Illston, and Raymond J. Hanley. 1994. Sharing
the Burden: Strategies for Public and Private Long-Te rm Care Insurance.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution
Wi e n e r, Joshua M., and David G. Stevenson. 1998. “Long-Te rm Care for the
Elderly and State Health Policy.” Spectrum, Winter.
a30Wise, David A. 1994. Studies in the Economics of Aging. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Wise, David A., ed. 1997. Facing the Age Wa v e . S t a n f o rd, Calif.: Hoover
Institution Press.
Wolfe, John R. 1993. The Coming Health Crisis: Who Will Pay for Care for the
Aged in the Twenty-first Century? Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Zedlewski, Sheila R., Roberta O. Barnes, Martha R. Burt, Timothy D. McBride,
and Jack A. Meyer. 1990. The Needs of the Elderly in the 21st Century.
Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute.
Replacing a Welfare Model with an Insurance Model
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College a31 a31Public Policy Brief a32 a32
As a senior scholar at the Levy Institute, Walter M. Cadette has written
on health care finance and regulation, Social Security reform, and pub-
lic capital formation. He is also chairman of the investment committee
of the Holy Cross Health System and an adjunct professor at Columbia
U n i v e r s i t y. He is a re t i red vice president of J.P. Morgan & Co.
Incorporated, where he was editor of and frequent contributor to its
publications Global Data Watch and World Financial Markets. Cadette’s
Levy Institute publications include several briefs: Prescription for Health
C a re Policy (No. 30); S a f e g u a rding Social Security (No. 34); with S Jay
Levy, Overcoming America’s Infrastructure Deficit(No. 40); and Regulating
H M O s (No. 47). He received a B.A. from Fordham College and an
M.A. from Georgetown University and did further study in economics
and finance at New York University.
About the AuthorPublic Policy Brief Series 
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College a33
No. 27, 1996, Targeting Inflation
The Effects of Monetary Policy on the
CPI and Its Housing Component
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou and 
L. Randall Wray
No. 28, 1996, Making Work Pay
Wage Insurance for the Working Poor
B a rry Bluestone and Te resa Ghilard u c c i
No. 29, 1997, Institutional Failure
and the American Worker
The Collapse of Low-Skill Wages
David R. Howell
No. 30, 1997, Prescription for
Health Care Policy
The Case for Retargeting Tax Subsidies
to Health Care
Walter M. Cadette
No. 31, 1997, A New Path from
Welfare to Work
The New Welfare and the Potential for
Workforce Development
Oren M. Levin-Waldman
No. 32, 1997, What’s Missing from
the Capital Gains Debate?
Real Estate and Capital Gains Taxation
Michael Hudson and Kris Feder
No. 33, 1997, Is There a Trade-off
between Unemployment and
Inequality?
No Easy Answers: Labor 
Market Problems in the United States
versus Europe
Rebecca M. Blank
No. 34, 1997, Safeguarding Social
Security
The Challenge of Financing the Baby
Boom’s Retirement
Walter M. Cadette
No. 35, 1997, Reflecting the
Changing Face of America
Multiracials, Racial Classification, and
American Intermarriage
Joel Perlmann
No. 36, 1997, Dangerous Metaphor:
The Fiction of the Labor Market
Unemployment, Inflation, and 
the Job Structure
James K. Galbraith
No. 37, 1997, Investment in
Innovation
Corporate Governance and
Employment: Is Prosperity Sustainable
in the United States?
William Lazonick and Mary
O’Sullivan
No. 38, 1997, Who Pays for
Disinflation?
Disinflationary Monetary Policy and the
Distribution of Income
Willem Thorbecke
No. 39, 1998, The Unmeasured
Labor Force
The Growth in Work Hours
Barry Bluestone and Stephen Rose
No. 40, 1998, Overcoming America's
Infrastructure Deficit
A Fiscally Responsible Plan for Public
Capital Investment
S Jay Levy and Walter M. Cadette
No. 41, 1998, Side Effects of
Progress
How Technological Change Increases the
Duration of Unemployment
William J. Baumol and Edward N.
Wolff
Public Policy Brief Series
To order, call 914-758-7700 or 202-887-8464 (in Washington, D.C.), fax 914-758-
1149, e-mail info@levy.org, or write The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard
College, Blithewood, PO Box 5000, Annandale-on-Hudson, NY 12504-5000.
For a complete list and short summaries of all the titles in the Public Policy Brief series,
see the Levy Institute web site at www.levy.org.Public Policy Brief Series 
Public Policy Brief a34
No. 42, 1998, Automatic Adjustment
of the Minimum Wage
Linking the Minimum Wage to
Productivity
Oren M. Levin-Waldman
No. 43, 1998, How Big Should the
Public Capital Stock Be?
The Relationship between Public Capital
and Economic Growth 
David Alan Aschauer
No. 44, 1998, The Asian Disease:
Plausible Diagnoses, Possible
Remedies
Regulation of Cross-Border Interbank
Lending and Derivatives Trade
Martin Mayer
No. 45, 1998, Did the Clinton Rising
Tide Raise All Boats?
Job Opportunity for the Less Skilled
Marc-André Pigeon and 
L. Randall Wray
No. 46, 1998, Self-reliance and
Poverty
Net Earnings Capacity versus Income
for Measuring Poverty
Robert Haveman and Andrew
Bershadker
No. 47, 1998, Regulating HMOs
An Ethical Framework for Cost-
Effective Medicine
Walter M. Cadette
No. 48, 1998, Japanese Corporate
Governance and Strategy
Adapting to Financial Pressures for
Change
William Lazonick
No. 49, 1998, Corporate Governance
in Germany
Productive and Financial Challenges
Mary O’Sullivan
No. 50, 1999, Public Employment
and Economic Flexibility
The Job Opportunity Approach to Full
Employment
Mathew Forstater
No. 51, 1999, Small Business and
Welfare Reform
Levy Institute Survey of Hiring and
Employment Practices
Oren M. Levin-Waldman
No. 52, 1999, Government Spending
in a Growing Economy
Fiscal Policy and Growth Cycles
Jamee K. Moudud
No. 53, 1999, Full Employment Has
Not Been Achieved
Full Employment Policy: Theory and
Practice
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
No. 54, 1999, Down and Out in the
United States




No. 55, 1999, Does Social Security
Need Saving?
Providing for Retirees throughout the
Twenty-first Century
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou and 
L. Randall Wray
No. 56, 1999, Risk Reduction in the
New Financial Architecture
Realities and Fallacies in International
Financial Reform
Martin Mayer
No. 57, 1999, Do Institutions Affect
Wage Structure?
Right-to-Work Laws, Unionization, and
the Minimum Wage
Oren M. Levin Waldman
No. 58, 1999, A New Approach to
Tax-Exempt Bonds
Infrastructure Financing with the AGIS
Bond
Edward V. Regan
No. 59, 2000, Financing Long-Term
Care
Replacing a Welfare Model with an
Insurance Model
Walter M. Cadette